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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the Minnesota Constitution was signed in 1857, there is 
little doubt that the creators anticipated the government would 
need the power of eminent domain1 to further the public good.2  
 
       †   J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2007; B.A., English and 
Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2002. 
 1. “Eminent domain” is “[t]he inherent power of a governmental entity to 
take privately owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to 
1
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Today, many cities engage in urban renewal projects that require 
them to utilize the power of eminent domain to take3 properties 
and use them in a way that will revitalize communities.4  However, 
this is a long and arduous process that sometimes takes years and 
can ultimately be abandoned.5  The property owners who are told 
that their property would be taken can be left with reduced values 
due to the condemnation process.6  If the property is not then 
condemned, have they suffered a de facto taking?7 
The courts have most often answered this question in the 
negative, with the notable exception of Johnson v. City of 
Minneapolis.8  Before Johnson, most courts were only willing to admit 
that a taking could be possible under those circumstances.9  Johnson 
marked the first case where the Minnesota Supreme Court found 
that a de facto taking occurred based on a city’s actions prior to 
condemnation without actually condemning the property.10 
This Case Note first describes the history of takings cases, most 
of which deal with urban renewal projects.11  It then recounts the 
facts and decision in Johnson v. City of Minneapolis.12  Next, it 
 
reasonable compensation for the taking.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 2. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 3. “A taking . . . is defined by statute to include every interference with the 
ownership, possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.”  18 DUNNELL 
MINN. DIGEST, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 5.00 (5th ed. 2005).  The statute is intended to 
“give effect to the constitutional requirement that private property shall not be 
taken, destroyed, or damaged for public use without just compensation being first 
paid or secured.”  Id.   
 4. Urban renewal projects have been consistently recognized as a proper 
excuse to use the power of eminent domain.  26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 78 
(2006).  Urban redevelopment is used to improve areas that are “deteriorated, 
deteriorating, substandard, or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare 
of the community.”  Id. (citing Aposporos v. Urban Redev. Comm’n of Stamford, 
790 A.2d 1167, 1172 (Conn. 2002)).  This is an approved public use under the 
U.S. Constitution.  Id. 
 5. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 505 (2005). 
 6. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 110 (Minn. 2003). 
 7. A “De facto taking” is an “[i]nterference with the use or value or 
marketability of land in anticipation of condemnation, depriving the owner of 
reasonable use and thereby triggering the obligation to pay just compensation.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1493 (8th ed. 2004). 
 8. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 9. See, e.g., Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87, 91 (6th Cir. 1964); Orfield v. Hous. 
& Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 341, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975); City 
of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 902 (N.Y. 1971). 
 10. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
2
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analyzes the departure from previous law that the court 
demonstrated, balancing the rights of property owners with the 
power of eminent domain.13  Finally, it concludes that while the 
decision is limited, it shows that the Minnesota Supreme Court is 
unwilling to allow cities to abuse their power of eminent domain.14 
II.  HISTORY 
The power of eminent domain is a right of the State under the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.15  The government can 
effect a taking in three ways: straight condemnation, legislative 
taking, or inverse condemnation.16  Straight condemnation and 
legislative taking are different from inverse condemnation in that 
they are condemnation proceedings initiated by the government.17  
Inverse condemnation is initiated by the affected property owners.18 
A.  The Penn Central Analysis 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,19 cited in 
Johnson, is heavily relied on in cases concerning inverse 
condemnation because it sets out a standard to evaluate when a 
taking has actually occurred.20  The property involved in Penn 
Central was Grand Central Terminal (“Terminal”) in New York 
City.21  New York City had afforded the Terminal landmark status in 
1967.22  In an effort to increase income, Penn Central entered into 
a lease with UGP Properties, Inc., who planned to construct office 
 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 16. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1984). 
 17. Id.  In a straight condemnation proceeding, an officer of the government 
initiates proceedings in order to purchase the property from the property owner.  
Id. at 3-4.  Just compensation is determined by a jury, judge, or special 
commission.  Id. at 4.  A legislative taking occurs when Congress enacts a statute 
appropriating the land.  Id. at 5.  Just compensation is determined after the fact.  
Id. 
 18. “Inverse condemnation” is “[a]n action brought by a property owner for 
compensation from a governmental entity that has taken the owner’s property 
without bringing formal condemnation proceedings.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
310 (8th ed. 2004). 
 19. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 20. Id. at 124. 
 21. Id. at 115. 
 22. Id. at 116. 
3
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space on the Terminal.23 
Two designs were drawn up and submitted to the Commission 
for approval.24  One design proposed that the office space sit above 
the Terminal, while the other design had the office space next to 
and part of the Terminal.25  Due to the Terminal’s landmark status, 
neither design was approved.26  Penn Central sued New York City 
on the theory that “the Landmarks Preservation Law had ‘taken’ 
their property without just compensation.”27 
Penn Central advanced the notion that “the airspace above the 
Terminal is a valuable property interest,” arguing that depriving 
the use of air rights is a taking.28  The Supreme Court did not 
accept this argument because “the submission that . . . [Penn 
Central] may establish a ‘taking’ simply by showing that they have 
been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they 
heretofore had believed was available for development is quite 
simply untenable.”29  The Court stated that it looks at the parcel as 
a whole, not as pieces of property rights.30 
Penn Central also advanced the theory that the Landmarks 
Law “significantly diminished the value of the Terminal site” and 
singled out owners of landmark property.31  However, the Court 
rejected “the proposition that diminution in property value, 
standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’”32  As to the Landmarks 
Law arbitrarily singling out properties, the Court pointed out that 
there were over 400 landmarks designated in New York City.33  In 
addition, Penn Central had the opportunity to present the 
Commission’s decision for judicial review to determine if the 
designation of landmark status was arbitrary.34 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  These designs were called Breuer I and Breuer II Revised because 
they were designed by architect Marcel Breuer.  Id. at 116-17. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 117-18.  Penn Central declined to submit any more designs, nor did 
it seek judicial review of the Commission’s decision to deny the application for 
Breuer I and Breuer II Revised.  Id. at 118.  In fact, though opposed to it, Penn 
Central did not seek judicial review of the Terminal’s designation as a landmark in 
the first place.  Id. at 116. 
 27. Id. at 119. 
 28. Id. at 130. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 131. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 132. 
 34. Id. at 133.  The Court pointed out, somewhat irritably, that “there is no 
4
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The Court next examined whether “interference” with the 
property was such that eminent domain proceedings, including 
compensation, were appropriate.35  The Court observed that the 
Landmarks Law did not interfere with the Terminal’s present use.36  
In fact, it allowed the Terminal to continue to be used as it had 
been for sixty-five years and operate with a “reasonable return.”37  
Also, the Court observed that the Landmarks Law did not expressly 
prohibit the use of the airspace above the Terminal, only that it not 
be used for fifty-story office buildings.38  Based on these findings, 
the Court concluded that the Landmarks Law did not effect a 
taking of Penn Central’s property.39  Instead, the loss of property 
rights was minimal.40 
B. Other Persuasive Development of Eminent Domain Law 
1.  Foster Decision 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Foster v. Herley41 started 
the trend toward recognizing that a taking could exist in situations 
where the condemnation process had not been completed.42  The 
City of Detroit called the affected property owners to City Hall to 
inform them that their property would be taken.43  They also 
instructed the property owners that they should not make any 
improvements.44  In addition, the City of Detroit placed a notice of 
 
basis whatsoever for a conclusion that courts will have any greater difficulty 
identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the context of landmark 
regulation than in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any other context.”  
Id. 
 35. Id. at 136. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 136-37.  The original structure included columns to support a 
twenty-story office tower that could be located above the terminal.  Id. at 115 n.15.  
The Commission did not deny that it would approve the originally planned twenty-
story office building, but again, Penn Central declined to submit any more designs 
utilizing the air space above the terminal.  Id. at 137 n.34. 
 39. Id. at 138.  “The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the 
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of 
the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not 
only the Terminal site proper but also other properties.”  Id. 
 40. Id. at 136-37. 
 41. 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964). 
 42. Id. at 89-91. 
 43. Id. at 88. 
 44. Id. 
5
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lis pendens45 on the property and passed a resolution stating that no 
new buildings could be erected or improvements made on the 
property.46 
These restrictions remained on the property for ten years until 
the City of Detroit finally decided to abandon the condemnation 
proceedings and lift them.47  At that point, the property had fallen 
into grave disrepair.48  To add insult to injury, the City of Detroit 
then required that the property owner demolish the buildings at 
his own expense because they were in such a state of 
deterioration.49 
Shortly thereafter, the City of Detroit reinstituted the 
condemnation proceedings and proposed to compensate the 
property owner at the value of the property in its demolished 
condition instead of the value before the condemnation 
proceedings began.50  It was then that the property owner instituted 
an action against the City of Detroit.51 
The property owner made a Due Process claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but the Michigan 
District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.52  The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Michigan District Court 
and ruled that federal jurisdiction existed based on the assumption 
that the lower court could rule that a taking occurred.53  While the 
court of appeals declined to rule on whether the situation actually 
qualified as a de facto taking,54 Foster opened the door to the 
 
 45. A notice of lis pendens is a “notice, recorded in the chain of title to real 
property, required or permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that 
certain property is the subject matter of litigation, and that any interests acquired 
during the pendency of the suit are subject to its outcome.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 950 (8th ed. 2004). 
 46. Foster, 330 F.2d at 88. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 88-89. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 89. 
 53. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).   
At the present time it appears to be settled that it is not enough that 
the plaintiff seeks to enforce a right which has its origin in the 
Constitution or a law of the United States, but that it must be shown by 
the complaint that the right will be supported if the Constitution or law 
is given one construction and will be defeated if given a different 
construction. 
Id. 
 54. Id. at 90. 
6
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possibility that a landowner could claim a taking based on a city’s 
actions during condemnation proceedings without actually passing 
title of the property to the government.55 
2. Clement Decision 
Following the Foster decision, in City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement 
Co.,56 the New York Court of Appeals dealt with the issue of whether 
a taking could occur absent a physical invasion of the property.57  In 
Clement, the plaintiff J. W. Clement Co. (“Clement”), a printing 
company, was forced to relocate to a new facility because of 
condemnation proceedings against its property.58  The 
condemnation process took many years, leaving the property worth 
much less than when the company was first informed of the 
planned condemnation.59 
Ultimately, the court decided against finding a de facto 
taking.60  The court reasoned that it was necessary to have “an 
assertion of dominion and control” to constitute a taking.61  Aside 
from delay, there was only “a manifestation of an intent to 
condemn,” which is not enough to prove a taking.62  However, it 
did not discount the possibility that precondemnation activities 
could rise to the level of exercising control over the property.63 
A strong policy decision also existed for not granting a taking 
based on these facts.64  Due to growth, Clement planned to relocate 
to a new facility within the next four or five years.65  While it is true 
that the condemnation proceedings caused Clement to relocate 
earlier than planned, the court could not ignore the fact that 
condemnation was not the only reason Clement relocated to a new 
facility.66 
 
 55. See Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64, 69 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 56. 269 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1971). 
 57. Id. at 899. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 900. 
 60. Id. at 904. 
 61. Id. at 903. 
 62. Id.  “It is important to note that the city never, by its statements or actions, 
directly or indirectly, interfered or sought to exercise any control over the 
property, thus inferentially depriving the claimant of its possession, enjoyment, or 
use.”  Id. at 905. 
 63. Id. at 904. 
 64. Id. at 901. 
 65. Id. at 900. 
 66. Id. at 901.  “[T]o expand the current concept of De facto taking on the 
7
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C. Minnesota Cases 
1.  Orfield Decision 
When Orfield v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority of St. Paul,67 a 
case heavily relied upon in the Johnson decision, was decided, 
Minnesota courts had not yet addressed the specific issue of 
whether precondemnation activity could be considered a taking 
under the Minnesota Constitution.68  The City of St. Paul applied 
for federal funds to initiate a redevelopment project in the Summit-
University Urban Renewal Area.69  The City of St. Paul surveyed the 
area and determined the properties that were most in need of 
funds.70 
The City of St. Paul classified Orfield’s property as 
substandard, but it was not at the top of the list for condemnation.71  
They repeatedly urged Orfield to keep his property in good 
condition and never told him it would be condemned.72  Orfield 
argued that the property declined as a result of the condemnation 
proceedings around his property,73 but the record clearly showed 
that the renewal project was borne out of the area’s decline, not 
the other way around.74 
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed the rulings from 
other jurisdictions in holding that there was not a taking.75  
However, the reasoning was slightly different.  Instead of the 
assertion of control test, the court held that “economic loss caused 
by the altered character of a neighborhood due to normal activities 
in connection with an urban renewal project, without more, does 
 
facts herein may well be to allow all property owners to seek refuge under the 
broader umbrella of De facto appropriation as soon as the proposed 
condemnation is announced, irrespective of their underlying motivation.”  Id. 
 67. 305 Minn. 336, 232 N.W.2d 923 (1975). 
 68. See Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987). 
 69. Orfield, 305 Minn. at 337, 232 N.W.2d at 925. 
 70. Id. at 337, 232 N.W.2d at 924. 
 71. Id. at 337, 232 N.W.2d at 925. 
 72. Id. at 338-39, 232 N.W.2d at 925. 
 73. Id. at 339, 232 N.W.2d at 926. 
 74. Id. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927. 
 75. Id. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927 (citing Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 
64, 69 (6th Cir. 1974); City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 902 
(N.Y. 1971)) (reinforcing the rule that properties adjacent to those slated for 
condemnation do not have a cause of action against the condemning authority 
because of decline in market values). 
8
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not constitute a de facto taking of the property in a constitutional 
sense.”76  To have a de facto taking, the court required an abuse of 
eminent domain power that is “specifically directed against a 
particular parcel.”77  While the court did not find that to be the case 
in Orfield,78 the ruling ultimately prepared the way for the court to 
decide Johnson. 
2. Fitger Decision 
Where Orfield was a clearer case against the property owners, 
Fitger Brewing Co. v. State79 was less so.  Over several years, the City of 
Duluth contemplated an expansion of Interstate 35 and, in 1969, 
the new planned route included the land where the Fitger Brewing 
Company (“Fitger”) was located.80  Around the same time, the 
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (“MPCA”) notified Fitger that 
it would need to install new pollution control devices in order to 
stay in operation.81 
Over the next couple years, Fitger went back and forth with 
the MPCA and the City of Duluth in deciding whether to close the 
plant or make the improvements required by the MPCA.82  With the 
help of the City of Duluth, Fitger received extensions on the 
deadline to complete the improvements, but the MPCA set its final 
deadline at September 30, 1972.83 
At that time, the City of Duluth still had not yet made a 
decision about which plan would be used for the Interstate 35 
expansion project, however, Fitger was informed that all the plans 
under consideration included the use of its land.84  Fitger requested 
and received a letter stating that fact as well as a statement that “it 
would be impractical . . . to install pollution abatement facilities in 
view of the planning currently in process.”85 
Unfortunately for Fitger, the letter also included a statement 
that there was a possibility the Fitger property would not be taken, 
which was an important part of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
 
 76. Id. at 341, 232 N.W.2d at 927. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. 416 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 80. Fitger, 416 N.W.2d at 201-02. 
 81. Id. at 202. 
 82. Id. at 202-03. 
 83. Id. at 203. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
9
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decision to rule against the brewery.86  Comparing the letter 
received in Orfield to the letter received in Fitger, the court 
concluded that the Fitger letter, like the Orfield letter, made it clear 
to Fitger that its property might not be taken.87  The court of 
appeals saw no reason to find the de facto taking that the Orfield 
court had suggested was possible.88 
The court also argued that there was no abuse of eminent 
domain power because Fitger’s “choice of action was not controlled 
or restrained by the state.”89  This assessment seemed to focus more 
on the significant control test suggested in earlier cases than the 
new Orfield standard that indicated a court may find abuse when 
actions are taken against a specific parcel of land.90  Fitger 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
the Supreme Court denied the request.91 
III.  THE JOHNSON DECISION 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
In 1983, the City of Minneapolis approved a redevelopment 
plan for the southern portion of Nicollet Mall that targeted an area 
spanning three-and-one-half blocks.92  The winning bid for the 
project was submitted by a French development corporation, La 
Societe Generale Immobiliere (“LSGI”), with whom the City of 
Minneapolis executed a contract in 1986 which required LSGI to 
acquire anchor tenants and the City of Minneapolis to acquire the 
 
 86. Id.  The letter stated: 
In addition, we must advise you that there is a possibility that I-35 may 
not be extended beyond Mesaba Avenue; the possibility of some other 
alignment of which we are unaware of at this time, other proposals 
from our consultants or other consultants, or the public, which may 
eliminate the necessity of taking the Fitger Brewing Company property.  
Id. at 203-04. 
 87. Id. at 208. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 904 (N.Y. 1971) 
(holding that the mere announcement of impending condemnation without a 
corresponding substantial impairment of the claimant’s right to use or enjoy the 
property does not constitute a compensable taking). 
 91. Fitger Brewing Co. v. Minnesota, 416 N.W.2d 200 (1987), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 819 (1988). 
 92. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 111 (Minn. 2003). 
10
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property through eminent domain.93  LSGI was also required to 
submit confidential progress reports to the City of Minneapolis, 
and the City of Minneapolis reserved the right to approve designs 
submitted by LSGI.94 
The City of Minneapolis rejected LSGI’s first design, which 
proposed a dome over the street for pedestrians and a tunnel 
underneath for traffic.95  At that time, LSGI had begun negotiating 
with department stores Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus as potential 
anchor tenants.96  The City of Minneapolis entered into a post-
closing agreement with LSGI that allowed LSGI to continue 
negotiating with potential anchor tenants and begin work on a new 
design.97  The agreement also included the City of Minneapolis’ 
obligation to acquire the property once a design had been 
approved and to lease that property to LSGI for ninety-nine years.98 
Shortly thereafter, the mayor of Minneapolis, who was against 
the redevelopment plan, wrote to Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus 
and urged them not to go through with the deal.99  These letters 
damaged LSGI’s ability to secure Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus 
as anchor tenants.100 
Despite this setback in the development project, the City of 
Minneapolis sent letters to the owners of the properties that were 
slated for redevelopment (“Owners”) informing them that the City 
of Minneapolis was planning to go through with the project.101  The 
properties would need to be appraised because they “would be 
acquired if the development takes place.”102  The City of 
Minneapolis included in the letters that appraising the property 
was not a definite commitment to buy it; however, it did not inform 
the tenants at any point thereafter that their properties would not 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 111-12. 
 96. Id. at 112. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  The mayor was opposed to the redevelopment plan from the start.  Id. 
at 111.  The original contract with LSGI was over the mayor’s veto.  Id.  When the 
mayor wrote to the two proposed anchor tenants, Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus, 
he “suggested that LSGI had not been honest with” them.  Id. at 112. 
 100. Id.  According to the district court’s findings, the letters “had a 
detrimental effect on LSGI’s ability to secure the prospective anchor tenants.”  Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
11
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be taken.103  This made it very difficult for the Owners to make full 
use of their property because existing and potential tenants were 
wary of moving into property that was going to be condemned.104 
At this point, despite LSGI’s continued attempts to secure 
Neiman Marcus as an anchor tenant for this project, the City of 
Minneapolis started talking to Neiman Marcus about getting 
involved in another project at the north end of Nicollet Mall.105  In 
addition, LSGI submitted another design, which was vetoed by the 
mayor.106  The City of Minneapolis issued a public notice of default 
because LSGI had not yet secured any anchor tenants, even though 
its failure was due in part to the City of Minneapolis’s actions.107 
A third design proposal was submitted and approved by the 
Minneapolis Community Development Agency (“MCDA”).108  The 
Mayor vetoed the design, but the MCDA overrode his veto.109  
However, in order to get the approval of the City Council, the City 
of Minneapolis required LSGI to make substantial changes to the 
design.110  Ultimately, the relationship deteriorated to the point 
where the City of Minneapolis terminated its contract with LSGI 
and reallocated the funds meant for this project to the project on 
the north end of Nicollet Mall with Neiman Marcus.111 
LSGI sued the City of Minneapolis for specific performance in 
June 1989112 and filed a notice of lis pendens on all the properties 
slated for redevelopment.113  The Minnesota Federal District Court 
found for LSGI, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned the ruling.114  The notice of lis pendens was not removed 
until after the trial was over in 1993.115 
The Owners sued the City of Minneapolis under a cause of 
action for inverse condemnation, claiming a de facto taking under 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 113. 
 105. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 649 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 106. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 113. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 877. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 113. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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both the U.S. Constitution and Minnesota Constitution.116  The 
district court ruled that the Owners had suffered a taking under 
both constitutions.117  It made several findings118 that led it to 
conclude that “the City’s activities . . . created a ‘cloud of 
condemnation’ over the properties,” reduced fair market values, 
and impaired property use “for an unreasonable period of time.”119  
Also, the court found that “the City had abused its eminent domain 
power and acted in bad faith with respect to [the Owners].”120 
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision.121  
Relying on Kirby Forest Industries v. United States,122 the court of 
appeals applied the “significant control” test.123  “It is not enough 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
The district court and the advisory jury found that the City had: (1) 
identified a specific geographic footprint that included [the Owner’s] 
properties; (2) in honoring the commitment to confidentiality, refused 
to provide information about the project to property owners; (3) not 
clearly communicated to [the Owners] that acquisition of their 
properties might not occur and that they should maintain their 
properties to avoid loss of value in case their properties were not 
acquired; and (4) not informed [the Owners] that the City had 
terminated the contract and negotiations with LSGI.  
Id. 
 119. Id. at 113-14. 
 120. Id. at 114. 
 121. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 649 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 122. 467 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 123. Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 884.  Kirby Forest concerned Congressional 
legislation that created a large national park that included land owned by Kirby 
Forest.  Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 7.  Kirby Forest argued for compensation 
from the time condemnation proceedings began instead of when the government 
tendered payment for the property.  Id. at 13.  They claimed that they were 
“deprived of all of the significant interests associated with ownership” because the 
condemnation proceedings had the “effect of preventing the owner of 
unimproved land thereafter from making any profitable use of it, or of selling it to 
another private party.”  Id.  While conceding that type of control was severe 
enough to warrant a taking, the Supreme Court did not find the argument to be 
representative of the situation.  Id. at 14-15.  “Until title passed to the United 
States, [Kirby Forest] was free to make whatever use it pleased of its property.”  Id. 
at 15.  The Government “never forbade [Kirby Forest] to cut the trees on the land 
or to develop the tract in some other way.”  Id.  “Indeed, [Kirby Forest] is unable 
to point to any statutory provision that would have authorized the Government to 
restrict [Kirby Forest’s] usage of the property prior to payment of the award.”  Id.  
Also interesting to note is a footnote in which the court mentioned testimony 
offered at trial suggesting that Kirby Forest would not have acted any differently 
toward the parcel of land had there not been any condemnation proceedings 
because it was used as a reserve logging area.  Id. at 6 n.8.  The Court stated that 
13
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under either Penn Central or Orfield for property owners to show 
that the government’s actions substantially impaired the value of 
their properties—those actions must also exert significant control 
over the owners’ use of their properties.”124  The court conceded 
that the City of Minneapolis acted in bad faith, however, it 
concluded that because the property owners knew their property 
might not be taken and were allowed to continue using their 
property, the City of Minneapolis did not have significant control 
over the properties.125 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first approached the issue of 
whether there was a taking under the U.S. Constitution.126  It 
examined the analysis of the court of appeals and found that the 
court of appeals had applied an incorrect test; it should have 
applied the Penn Central analysis.127  However, the supreme court 
declined to remand the case to the court of appeals or apply the 
correct standard itself because it found the analysis irrelevant.128  
Specifically, the supreme court found the actions by the City of 
Minneapolis violated the Minnesota Constitution.129 
The Minnesota Constitution requires “just compensation” 
whenever private property is taken for public use.130  Under 
Minnesota law, “[a] taking include[s] every interference, under the 
right of eminent domain, with the possession, enjoyment, or value 
of private property.”131  The Johnson court emphasized that a 
physical invasion of the property was not necessary to have a taking 
of the property, but that economic loss due to normal activities 
taken by a city to implement redevelopment plans was not usually 
 
this testimony would not be given weight in the decision, but like other cases 
dealing with condemnation proceedings, little facts such as this appear to sway the 
courts in one direction or another.  See, e.g., Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 124. Johnson, 649 N.W.2d at 884. 
 125. Id. at 885. 
 126. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 114-15. 
 127. Id. at 115.  “This test requires the court to consider: (1) the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character 
of the government regulation.”  Id. at 114-15 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City 
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 128. Id. at 115. 
 129. Id. 
 130. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 131. MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (2004). 
14
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compensable.132  However, an abuse of the power of eminent 
domain may be tantamount to regulatory control, constituting a de 
facto taking “when that abuse is specifically directed at a particular 
parcel.”133 
The court compared the facts of Johnson to Orfield and found 
Johnson factually distinct in three ways.134  First, in Orfield the City of 
St. Paul kept the property owner aware of the situation.135  The 
Owners in Johnson were not informed at any point that their 
properties might not be acquired.136  Second, the property in Orfield 
was not specifically targeted.137  In Johnson, the City of Minneapolis 
targeted a specific stretch of property along Nicollet Avenue.138  
Third, in Orfield, the City of St. Paul did not act in bad faith.139  The 
City of Minneapolis in Johnson did not use its best efforts to keep 
the Owners informed or work with LSGI, resulting in a bad faith 
effort.140 
The court concluded that the City of Minneapolis had abused 
its power, leaving the Owners in limbo with unmarketable 
property.141  This was a de facto taking.  However, the court 
qualified its ruling by stating that this was a “narrow and rare 
instance,” and cautioned that this ruling would not apply to all 
owners who become subject to precondemnation activity.142 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE JOHNSON DECISION 
Johnson was the first case in which the Minnesota courts ruled 
that precondemnation activity constituted a de facto taking.143  It 
 
 132. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115. 
 133. Id. (quoting Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 
341, 232 N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Orfield, 305 Minn. at 338-39, 232 N.W.2d at 925. 
 136. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  The court qualified its finding of bad faith by stating, “[w]hile each 
action taken by the City, analyzed separately, could be viewed as normal 
condemnation activity, the cumulative effect of the actions rendered [the 
Owners’] properties unmarketable for years while the development was being 
negotiated and, later, in litigation.”  Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  Any one particular action taken by the City in Johnson would not 
necessarily be cause for a de facto taking under a different situation.  Id.  It was the 
combination of factors that compelled the court to rule in favor of the Owners.  Id. 
 143. See Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 341, 232 
15
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marks a distinct departure from previous case law.144  Significantly, 
the court refused to give the decision too much weight when it 
refused to examine the merits under the U.S. Constitution and 
limited the decision to its facts.145  Instead, the court interpreted 
the Minnesota Constitution146 and possibly opened the door to 
similar litigation despite its clearly limited scope.147 
A. Courts Wary of Expanding the Definition of a “Taking” 
The general rule is that “mere plotting or planning in 
anticipation of a public improvement does not constitute a taking 
or damaging of the property affected.”148  The courts have 
compelling reasons for being wary of expanding the definition of a 
taking to include situations where condemnation was abandoned.149  
Planning to condemn does not necessarily mean that there is an 
invasion of property or an infringement on the use and enjoyment 
of property.150  In many cases, a plan to condemn property that is 
abandoned will leave the property completely undisturbed.151 
Also, the courts operate under the assumption that every 
property has a threat of condemnation because the government 
can take property for public use at any time.152  The courts are likely 
loath to undermine that basic principle of property ownership.  On 
a more practical side, the courts believe that condemnation 
proceedings should not be hindered because they “aid [in] the 
growth and expansion of municipalities” and any hindrance to that 
 
N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975); see also Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87, 91 (6th Cir. 1964) 
(recognizing subject matter jurisdiction for federal court to hear a 
precondemnation activity claim); City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 
895, 902 (N.Y. 1971) (reversing trial court’s finding of a de facto taking). 
 144. Compare Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116 (holding that the property owners 
were entitled to compensation for the time their properties were under the threat 
of condemnation), with Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that “the landowner’s freedom of choice on 
improvements [was] not substantially destroyed by state action”). 
 145. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 146. Id. at 115-16. 
 147. See Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Lu Hardin, Government Theft: The Taking of Private 
Property to Benefit the Favored Few, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 81, 102 (2004). 
 148. J. R. Kemper, Annotation, Plotting or Planning in Anticipation of Improvement 
as Taking or Damaging of Property Affected, 37 A.L.R. 3d 127, § 3 (2004). 
 149. Id. § 4. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
16
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power may slow progress.153  However, there is a point where a city’s 
actions go too far, invading the property and infringing on its use 
and enjoyment.154 
B. Fitger Versus Johnson 
In Orfield, the supreme court suggested that an abuse of the 
power of eminent domain directed at a particular parcel of land 
would be cause for finding a de facto taking.155  However, it did not 
find an abuse in that case,156 nor did the court of appeals in the 
subsequent case of Fitger.157  But Johnson conclusively demonstrated 
a situation in which there was an abuse of power, serving to balance 
the rights of property owners with the right of cities to exercise the 
power of eminent domain.158 
The hesitancy to open up this issue was clear when the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined review of Fitger after the court of appeals 
seemed to misapply the Orfield standard.159  The Supreme Court was 
likely apprehensive about applying the Orfield standard for all the 
reasons mentioned above.  While there was a hardship there, and 
Fitger was forced to close down, Fitger was still able to operate its 
business normally up until the point of closing and was able to sell 
the land to a developer.160  Also, the City of Duluth made efforts to 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Minn. 2003). 
 155. Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 342, 232 
N.W.2d 923, 927 (1975). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 158. Gideon Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain Law 2003-2004, in 
PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 179 
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, Aug. 26-28, 2004). 
 159. “We know from Orfield that there is no such abuse if the state makes it 
clear to the owners there may be no taking, does not abuse its discretion by 
abandoning a plan to take, and urges the owners to make necessary property 
improvements.”  Fitger, 416 N.W.2d at 208.  In a letter from the State Highway 
Commissioner, the State recognized the impracticality of making improvements to 
the brewery given that it was likely to be condemned, although the State 
maintained that it did not promise to take the property.  Id. at 203-04.  The City of 
Duluth knew that Fitger was counting on this letter to make a decision to close the 
plant and was even promised the letter on the condition that he not make a big 
fuss about the proceedings to the media.  Id. at 203.  In addition, the City of 
Duluth encouraged Fitger to oppose landmark status for the brewery because it 
needed the land for the highway.  Id. at 204.  Despite these facts, the court of 
appeals insisted that the City of Duluth did not abuse its discretion.  Id. at 208. 
 160. Id. at 204.  The action against the State was instituted in January 1978, 
and the property was sold to a private developer in 1983 for $700,000.  Id. 
17
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work with Fitger and the MPCA.161  In the end, the City of Duluth 
did not work fast enough to have a final decision when Fitger 
needed it.162 
In contrast, the Owners in Johnson suffered a much greater 
hardship in terms of the effect of the City of Minneapolis’s actions 
on their property and the treatment they endured.163  The City of 
Minneapolis “identified a specific geographic footprint . . . refused 
to provide information about the project, [had] not clearly 
communicated to [the Owners] that acquisition of their properties 
might not occur and that they should maintain their properties,” 
and did not inform the Owners that it had terminated the contract 
with LSGI.164 
The District Court of Minnesota that originally heard the case 
listed findings that supported the conclusion that the City of 
Minneapolis had “abused its eminent domain power and acted in 
bad faith with respect to [the Owners].”165  The condemnation 
process was dragged out over years, with the Owners losing tenants 
and declining property values making it nearly impossible to keep 
the property running.166  This was the same abuse described in 
Orfield, making it impossible for the court to ignore.167  The court 
could not have ruled in any other way given the rule set out in 
Orfield.168  However, the ruling was limited.169 
 
 161. Id. at 202-03. 
 162. Id. at 204. 
 163. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 111-13 (Minn. 2003). 
 164. Id. at 113. 
 165. Id. at 114.   
From its findings, the district court concluded that: (1) the City’s 
activities in connection with the LSGI project created a ‘cloud of 
condemnation’ over the properties from at least November 23, 1987 
until the LSGI suit was resolved in February 1995; (2) the City’s actions 
significantly reduced the fair market value of [the Owners’] properties 
and caused a loss of rental income, thereby causing a substantial and 
adverse economic impact on the properties and rendering [the 
Owners’] businesses commercially impracticable; (3) the City uniquely 
burdened [the Owners] by impairing their existing and prospective 
uses of the properties for an unreasonable period of time; and (4) the 
City interfered with [the Owners’] investment-backed expectations by 
disturbing their longstanding and existing uses of the properties. 
Id. at 113-14. 
 166. Id. at 114. 
 167. Id. at 116. 
 168. Id.   
While each action taken by the City, analyzed separately, could be 
viewed as normal condemnation activity, the cumulative effect of the 
actions rendered [the Owners’] properties unmarketable for years 
18
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C. Limitations of Johnson 
First, the court declined to rule on whether the City of 
Minneapolis’s actions constituted a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution.170  It made its findings strictly on the text of the 
Minnesota Constitution stating, “[t]aking . . . include[s] every 
interference, under the right of eminent domain, with the 
possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.”171  This case 
only extends as far as the State of Minnesota and possibly as 
persuasive authority for other states that have similar wording in 
their constitutions. 
The decision states that the reason why the Minnesota 
Supreme Court declined to look at the U.S. Constitution was 
because it was irrelevant based on the fact that the Owners are 
entitled to compensation under the Minnesota Constitution.172  
However, Gideon Kanner suggests that an application of the 
analysis found in Penn Central would have been incorrect.173  The 
Penn Central analysis is appropriate where a legitimate regulation 
goes too far.174  
Nothing of the sort is true in precondemnation blight 
cases. There the government is not regulating. It is then 
not promoting the public good, nor engaging in any kind 
of legitimate police power regulation (whose objectives 
are the promotion of public health, safety, welfare or 
morals). Rather, it is then engaging in a self-serving 
illegitimate activity whose purpose is not to further the 
public condition, but rather to interfere in the real estate 
market untainted by government manipulation, in order 
 
while development was being negotiated and, later, in litigation.  
Because of the unique circumstances of this case, we find no basis for 
reversing the district court’s findings and conclusions of law that the 
City specifically targeted [the Owners’] properties and acted in bad 
faith and conclude that this case presents a narrow and rare instance in 
which precondemnation activity constituted a taking under the 
Minnesota Constitution. 
Id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 115. 
 171. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (2004)).  This is in contrast to 
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which only promises that no 
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 172. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115. 
 173. Kanner, supra note 158, at 179. 
 174. Id. 
19
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to lower the value of the subject properties and save itself 
money when it finally gets around to acquiring the 
affected properties by eminent domain ‘on the cheap.’ 
That is not a legitimate government activity.175 
While the facts in Johnson do not support a contention that the 
City of Minneapolis was attempting to lower the property values in 
order to take advantage of the decline later, it was definitely a 
situation in which the City of Minneapolis was interfering with the 
market by misleading the Owners and essentially thwarting its own 
project.176 
Second, the court explicitly states, “our decision is limited to 
the particular facts presented.”177  While the case may have finally 
demonstrated a situation in which the abuse of power was severe 
enough to justify a de facto taking, the court was sure to 
communicate that this was not a “sweeping” decision.178  A 
collection of factors convinced the court to rule in favor of the 
Owners, factors that, when taken alone, would not have been 
persuasive.179 
The court limited its holding to the facts of this decision for 
the same reasons that courts are wary of looking at this issue in the 
first place.180  As mentioned above, the courts do not want to hinder 
government’s fundamental right of eminent domain, or more 
importantly, its right to abandon condemnation proceedings.181  It 
is an essential power to continue the growth and progress of 
cities.182 
If cities were forced to compensate everyone they considered 
for condemnation, they would not be able to afford the utilization 
of one of their basic functions, taking property for public use.183  
Despite this danger, the Minnesota Supreme Court still decided to 
rule against the City of Minneapolis.184  This speaks to the 
contention that even though this ruling could prove to be a 
disturbance to eminent domain law, the court will not allow cities 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 111-13. 
 177. Id. at 116. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Kemper, supra note 148, § 4. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115. 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/2
09CONNERS.DOC 5/31/2006  1:14:43 PM 
2006]  THE EXPANDING DEFINITION OF A TAKING 1485 
to outright abuse their power.185 
D. The Effect of the Minnesota Constitution 
These concerns beg the question of why the Minnesota 
Supreme Court opened this can of worms in its decision in Orfield, 
and why it eventually found a taking in Johnson.  The answer can 
most likely be found in the Minnesota Constitution.  Where the 
general rule is that plotting and planning cannot be considered a 
taking, the court recognized a distinction in the Minnesota 
Constitution that may include exceptions to that rule.186 
The language of the Minnesota Constitution is broader than 
the language of the U.S. Constitution.187  The U.S. Constitution 
states that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”188  However, the 
Minnesota Constitution takes it a step further, stating that 
“[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for 
public use without just compensation.”189 
The Johnson court examined the language from the Minnesota 
Constitution and other statutory provisions to conclude that “[t]he 
clear intent of Minnesota law is to fully compensate its citizens for 
losses related to property rights incurred because of state 
actions.”190  Minnesota law provides more protection to property 
owners from the State than federal law does, which is why the 
Orfield court expanded the definition of a taking under Minnesota 
law.191 
E. The Future of Eminent Domain 
The effect of the Johnson decision is still largely unknown.  It 
 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13, with U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 188. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 189. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 190. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115 (citing State by Humphrey v. Strom, 493 
N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992)).  The court also cited a Minnesota statute stating 
that “a taking ‘include[s] every interference, under the right of eminent domain, 
with the possession, enjoyment, or value of private property.’”  Id. (citing MINN. 
STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2 (2002)). 
 191. See Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 Minn. 336, 340, 232 
N.W.2d 923, 926 (1975). 
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has only been cited in one case of any significance.192  In Concept 
Properties v. Minnetrista, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
distinguished the facts in Johnson from the facts at hand.193  Concept 
Properties dealt with a land-use policy, not an abuse of the 
condemnation proceedings.194 
The plaintiff in Concept Properties urged the court to apply the 
Johnson standard, which is more lenient than the arbitration test 
called for by governing case law on regulatory takings.195  However, 
the court refused to apply the Johnson standard and emphasized 
that the facts in Johnson were “unique.”196  Concept Properties is not 
very factually similar to Johnson, so it is unsurprising that the court 
refused to adopt the Johnson standard.197 
Nonetheless, the Johnson decision serves as a possible 
movement from the long-held tradition to give legislative bodies 
“great judicial deference” when it comes to eminent domain 
proceedings.198  It could have implications for other issues that arise 
as a result of eminent domain,199 though it did not in Concept 
Properties.200  Many jurisdictions are currently dealing with whether 
 
 192. See Concept Props., LLP v. Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804, 823-24 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  The plaintiff, Concept Properties, owned a parcel of land that was 
included in the Metropolitan Urban Services Area (“MUSA”), or “the designated 
portion of the metropolitan area in which governmental agencies support urban 
development by providing necessary public facilities and services, including sewer 
service.”  Id. at 810-11.  In 1998, the property was no longer considered to be 
included in the MUSA.  Id. at 811.  The property owners purchased the property 
in the midst of the city’s revisions of MUSA property and under the impression 
that it was included in the MUSA.  Id. at 812.  Subsequently, Concept Properties 
sued the city based on a claim of a regulatory taking because they were no longer 
able to develop the land in the way they had planned.  Id. at 813.  However, while 
the property cannot connect to the sewer system, a septic system can be built to 
serve the property.  Id. at 823.  Thus, development is possible, just more difficult.  
Id. 
 195. Id. (“In applying the arbitration standard, we consider whether the 
regulation deprives the property of all reasonable uses . . . .  If an alternative use is 
available, even if it is not the most profitable use, the regulation has not denied 
the property all economically beneficial use.”) 
 196. Id. 
 197. Compare Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 111-13 (Minn. 
2003) (deciding whether precondemnation proceedings rise to the level of a de 
facto taking), with Concept Props., 694 N.W.2d at 810-13 (determining whether a 
regulatory action was arbitrary or capricious). 
 198. Whitehead & Hardin, supra note 147, at 102. 
 199. See id. 
 200. Concept Props., 694 N.W.2d at 823-24. 
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state and local governments have a legitimate public use for 
property they propose to condemn.201  While Johnson does not 
address that particular issue, it provides foundation for case law 
opposing overreaching use of eminent domain by the 
government.202 
However, the encompassing message of all the cases that 
decided whether precondemnation activities rose to the level of a 
compensable taking seems to depend on the unique facts of each 
case.203  The court granted relief in Johnson because the facts were 
particularly egregious.204  There was a real showing of bad faith on 
the part of the City of Minneapolis and, as a result, the Owners 
suffered significant damage.205  In Fitger, there seemed to be some 
bad faith on the part of the City of Duluth, but the loss sustained, 
while unfortunate, was minimal.206 
It will take another particularly egregious set of facts to repeat 
the ruling in Johnson.207  The most likely outcome of this case is that 
cities will keep property owners informed of the status of 
condemnation proceedings and continually remind them that 
there are no guarantees their property will be taken because, if they 
do not, the courts may make them answer for it.208 
 
 201. Whitehead & Hardin, supra note 147, at 81. 
 202. Id. at 102. 
 203. Cf. Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87, 88 (6th Cir. 1964) (allowing jurisdiction 
under the federal Constitution because a taking could be found where (1) the city 
initiated condemnation proceedings, refusing to allow property owners to build 
on their land for ten years; (2) then abandoned the condemnation; and (3) later 
reinstituted the proceedings and took the property at its severely deteriorated state 
because of the city’s actions); Orfield v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of St. Paul, 305 
Minn. 336, 340, 232 N.W.2d 923, 926 (1975) (denying compensation when the city 
failed to condemn property when the condemnation proceedings were not the 
cause of the deterioration of the property and the city kept the property owner 
well-informed that his property may not be taken); Fitger Brewing Co. v. State, 416 
N.W.2d 200, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling against the property owner’s claim 
for compensation for the closing of the brewery when the brewery owner was able 
to sell the land to a developer); Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895, 900 
(N.Y. 1971) (refusing to grant compensation for precondemnation activities when 
the property owner planned to relocate to a new facility in a few years). 
 204. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Minn. 2003). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Fitger, 416 N.W.2d at 208. 
 207. See Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 208. See id.  “In making the judgment, courts will no doubt consider the good 
faith of the condemning authority, the circumstances under which various 
announcements or communications were made, and the value of giving the 
condemnee as much advance notice as possible.”  4-12B JULIUS L. SACKMAN, 
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12B.17 (revised 3d. ed. 2002). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts have been reluctant to expand the definition of a 
taking under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions.209  However, as 
demonstrated by Johnson, some situations go too far, requiring the 
courts to step in.  Johnson serves to warn cities that while they have a 
lot of leeway to implement or abandon urban renewal projects, 
they may not abuse their privilege.210  When cities target specific 
properties, they have some responsibility to the owners of those 
properties to keep them informed such that their properties will 
not be ruined in the process of condemnation.211 
Eminent domain proceedings have, some feel, grown out of 
hand in many respects.212  This ruling hints at a trend for courts to 
take a harder line with cities who abuse their privilege.213  However, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court was careful to base its decision solely 
on the Minnesota Constitution and to limit its holding to the 
unique facts.214  It is the egregiousness of the facts and ultimate 
outcomes for the plaintiffs in each case that seem to drive the 
individual decisions.215  Nonetheless, cities beware: Property owners 
have rights under the Minnesota Constitution as well. 
 
 
 209. See Kemper, supra note 148, at 127. 
 210. See Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Whitehead & Hardin, supra note 147, at 81. 
One of the most contentious issues facing local and state governments is 
the taking of private property to convey it to another private entity for 
the development of a shopping center, baseball park, industrial site, or 
some other use deemed advantageous to the well-being of the 
community.  Often the reason advanced is that the public will benefit 
from the proposed taking by an increased tax base or the removal of a 
blighted part of town.  This is said to be a public use.  Sadly, the 
definition of public use has grown to include almost any use that meets a 
developer’s or local politician’s political and social agenda.   
Id. 
 213. Id. at 102.  “Recently, to the astonishment of local governments, courts 
are actually questioning the broad definition of public use.”  Id. at 81. 
 214. Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 116. 
 215. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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